

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Robert Lynn Schrock, Jr.,	)	C/A No. 3:17-2651-CMC-PJG
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	<b>REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION</b>
	)	
Palmetto Health,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	
_____	)	

The plaintiff, Robert Lynn Schrock, Jr., proceeding *pro se*, brings this civil action against the defendant, Palmetto Health. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the action should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.

**I. Factual and Procedural Background**

Plaintiff indicates he was admitted to the Palmetto Parkridge Baptist Hospital against his will where he was placed in a secluded room for suicide watch. Plaintiff claims the hospital staff forced him to give a urine sample for a drug test to which he did not consent. He claims the hospital staff refused to allow him to urinate until he gave a sample, which caused him pain. He also alleges he was not given basic necessities, such as linens, food, water, medication, or legal representation while he was isolated overnight.

Plaintiff files this action on a standardized form for *pro se* filers to raise a negligence claim in a federal diversity action. The Complaint also appears to list defamation and “HIPAA violation”<sup>1</sup> as causes of action. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages from multiple injuries including lost wages, health insurance and health care costs, loss of freedom, family counseling, and pain and suffering.

## **II. Discussion**

### **A. Standard of Review**

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

This court is required to liberally construe *pro se* complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).

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<sup>1</sup> Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).

## **B. Analysis**

The instant case is subject to summary dismissal because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, *sua sponte*, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id. at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).

There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction[.]”

The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) “federal question” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As discussed below, the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint do not fall within the scope of either form of this court’s limited jurisdiction. First, federal question jurisdiction requires

the plaintiff to show that the case is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s allegations do not raise a cognizable cause of action for the violation of a federal statute or constitutional provision, nor is any source of federal question jurisdiction otherwise evident from the face of the pleading. While Plaintiff appears to seek relief for a violation of HIPAA, no such cause of action exists for private individuals to sue entities covered by the law. See Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010); Hopkins v. Bethea, No. 3:06-3467-MBS-JRM, 2007 WL 1231652, at \*5 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2007) (citing Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, such conclusory allegations, without supporting facts or citation to specific legal precedent establishing a cause of action, fails to adequately establish federal question jurisdiction under Rule 8. See Burgess v. Charlottesville Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 477 F.2d 40, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he mere assertion in a pleading that the case is one involving the construction or application of the federal laws does not authorize the District Court to entertain the suit[,] nor does federal jurisdiction attach on the bare assertion that a federal right or law has been infringed or violated or that the suit takes its origin in the laws of the United States.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case.

Second, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of \$75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 nn. 13-16 (1978). As to corporate parties, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(c)(1); see also Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 170 (4th Cir. 2014). In absence of diversity of citizenship, the amount in controversy is irrelevant. Here, Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint that he is a citizen of South Carolina and the defendant is incorporated, and has its principal place of business, in South Carolina. Consequently, diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case because the parties are citizens of the same state.

The Complaint reveals no other basis of jurisdiction. Consequently, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.

### **III. Conclusion**

Accordingly, the court recommends that the action be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.<sup>2</sup>

November 13, 2017  
Columbia, South Carolina

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Paige J. Gossett  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

*Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.*

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<sup>2</sup> In light of the court's recommendation, it is further recommended that Plaintiff's motion for issuance of a subpoena be denied as moot. (ECF No. 4.)

### **Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk  
United States District Court  
901 Richland Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).